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Abstract: Incidents involving fires and explosions present a major hazard to the workforce on
offshore oil and gas platforms. Following the Piper Alpha Disaster in 1988, platform operators
for the UK sector are required to submit safety cases for approval by the Health and Safety
Executive. A key requirement of these safety cases is that hazards associated with an
accidental release of hydrocarbons have been demonstrated to be as low as reasonably
practicable.
This paper aims to describe a process for estimating the expected number of fatalities on
offshore platforms with open-sided modules using a Monte Carlo simulation method
implemented within the safety and reliability of offshore structures (SAROS) software. The
process involves estimation of the frequency and magnitude of jet fires, pool fires, and
explosions. This is combined with the distribution of the workforce over the platform at the
time of the incident to predict the risk of fatality.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The areas containing processing equipment on off-
shore platforms are known as modules. There are
two fundamental types of module, namely open
and enclosed, categorized according to the platform
construction. Enclosed modules require forced
ventilation; open modules are open sided, allowing
the module to be naturally ventilated by the wind.
It is the latter that will be considered in this paper.
The number and configuration of modules making
up an individual platform vary depending on the
design and construction. Each process module con-
tains pipework, process vessels, storage containers,
and the required control systems dependent on the
function of the individual module.
The well fluids, oil, gas, condensate, and water
are delivered to the platform from any well into the
wellhead module. The fluid is then passed to the
separation module where the water is drained; the
oil is separated from the remaining fluid and trans-
ported to shore for refining. The condensate is
removed from the gas mixture and the gas pressur-
ized within the compression module before leaving
the platform.
Each module will contain a number of isolatable
process sections containing hydrocarbon fluids.
These sections may have the potential to depressur-
ize or blowdown, routeing gas to the flare. On detec-
tion of a leak on a section, isolation valves would
close to restrict the amount of inventory available
to leak into the module and, where present, a blow-
down valve would open to vent gas from the section
to the flare. Both systems function to reduce the
magnitude of the gas release.
The occurrence of a loss of containment is identi-
fied by manual detection, gas detection, or fire
detection systems dependent on the nature of the
event and how it develops. Gas detection systems
installed on the platform can take two forms: the
first detects the concentration of gas in the module
by either sampling or using infrared beams,
tripping at some preset limit; the second is a sonic
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detector that identifies the sound made by the gas
release.
On detection of a leak or a fire, the deluge system
on the platform will be activated. The deluge system
releases water on to the affected area of the module,
with the intention of suppressing the severity of the
fire or reducing the overpressures should an explo-
sion occur.
Combustion of a flammable-gas–air mixture
occurs if the composition of the mixture lies in the
flammable range and if the conditions exist for
ignition [1]. The concentration is required to be
above the lower flammable limit (LFL) and below
the upper flammable limit (UFL). Experimental
work conducted by British Gas [2, 3] has shown
that substantial reductions in overpressure result
when the concentration of gas in air deviates from
the stoichiometric concentration.
Significant amounts of research have been con-
ducted into the characteristics of fires occurring in
process plants. One method used in modelling both
jet and pool fires was to consider the flame dimen-
sions and the surface emissive power [1]. In the
safety and reliability of structures (SAROS) software,
the jet fire is modelled as a conical flame radiating
away from the source of the leak and a pool fire is
represented by an upright cylinder [4].
To date, there have been two major incidents
resulting in the loss of production platforms in the
North Sea. One of these incidents was the Piper
Alpha disaster, which occurred in the British sector
and resulted in the loss of 167 lives [5]. Recommen-
dations made during the enquiry following this dis-
aster led to the requirement that operators submit
a safety case for each offshore platform. The safety
case is to assess all types of hazard, including fires
and explosions, and requires acceptance by the
Health and Safety Executive.
This paper presents a methodology to model fires
and explosions on a platform and to estimate the
number of fatalities in an incident as is consistent
with the requirements of the Health and Safety
Executive. Modules are assumed to be of the open-
sided, naturally ventilated type. The methodology
presented has been implemented within the
SAROS software package. Earlier developmental
work on SAROS has been reported in references [6]
and [7].
2 HAZARDS ON OFFSHORE PLATFORMS
There are a number of hazards experienced when
well fluids are processed on offshore platforms. The
hazard considered in this paper is the uncontrolled
release of hydrocarbons combined with the potential
for ignition. This can result in a pool fire (oil release)
or a jet fire (gas release) if ignition is immediate or an
explosion if, following a gas release, there is a
delayed ignition.
In order for an explosion or a fire to occur on a
platform there must initially be a release of hydro-
carbons, which can take one of three forms: liquid-
only release, gas-only release, or combined liquid
and gaseous release.
Immediate ignition of a high-pressure gas release
within a module will create a jet fire. The amount
of oxygen available to support combustion within
an open module is unlimited and therefore the fire
will be extinguished only when the volume of inven-
tory available has been reduced sufficiently that it no
longer supports a flame.
A delay between commencement of a gaseous
release and occurrence of the ignition source has
the potential to cause an explosion. Prior to ignition
the gaseous fuel will form a cloud within the module.
An ignition source could ignite the gas cloud, caus-
ing an accelerating flame front to propagate through
the cloud.
Ignition of an oil pool results in the formation of a
pool fire. As for jet fires, the sustainability of the fire
in an open module is dependent on the availability
of leaking hydrocarbons rather than oxygen.
The magnitude of an explosion will be specified by
the overpressures that it produces. For a fire the heat
generated and radiated to the platform structure and
process vessels is of concern. Flame length and
fire duration are used to indicate the magnitude of
the fire.
3 MONTE CARLO SIMULATION
The method used to model the risks on offshore plat-
forms is the Monte Carlo simulation method. Monte
Carlo analysis is conducted as an experiment on a
computer. The method uses random samples from
distributions that govern the physical parameters
and times to occurrence of events in the process.
For this particular model, each run starts with a
hydrocarbon release and monitors the actions of
the safety systems and the occurrence of an ignition
through to the consequences. The results of a great
number of simulations are then used to determine
the probability distributions for the magnitude of
the resulting fires and explosions and the conse-
quential fatalities.
The method requires the use of a random number
generator to create the random sample in varia-
bles during each simulation. Initially the leaking
section will be selected according to the relative like-
lihood of a leak on each particular section in com-
parison with the others in the module. The size of
the hole is selected as a random sample from the
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hole size distribution. This determines the leak
characteristics.
The occurrence of many events in the simulation
are specified by a constant rate of occurrence. The
ignition rate and failure rates of various systems
such as the deluge system are examples. In this
case, the cumulative failure distribution F(t) for an
exponential distribution with mean 1/l is given by
FðtÞ ¼ 1 elt ð1Þ
A random sample can be taken by generating a
random number X in the range from 0 to 1 and
equating to F(t) since both quantities have the
same properties. The time t to failure is given by
t ¼  1
l
ln X ð2Þ
Specific conditions, such as functionality of the
isolation or blowdown valves, are determined by
sampling a fixed probability event. A random
number is compared with the probability of the
event failure; if the random number is less than this
probability, the system is assumed to be unavailable.
SAROS was run a number of times, varying the
number of simulations each time up to a maximum
of 3 · 106 simulations. The results were found to
converge prior to 106 simulations.
4 DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODEL
The SAROS model was initially developed as an ana-
lytical method for explosion modelling by Andrews
et al. [8]. It has since been adapted to model fires
and explosions using Monte Carlo simulation. The
model determines the attributes of the initial release,
calculates the fire or explosion characteristics, and
predicts the number of fatalities. The following sec-
tions describe how each of the events in a simulation
are modelled.
4.1 Hydrocarbon release
The section on which the leak occurs is selected
according to the relative likelihood of a leak occur-
ring on each section. The hole size is then obtained
by randomly sampling from the section hole size dis-
tribution. Whether the leak is oil, gas, or condensate
is determined by the specific inventory of the section
and the location of the hole.
4.2 Initial hydrocarbon release rate
Prior to detection, the initial release rate of hydro-
carbons is calculated assuming that the inventory
available for release is infinite and the driving pres-
sure in the leaking section will remain constant.
The gas discharge rate is calculated using the laws
of gas dynamics and the condensate discharge rate is
calculated by assuming that there is a reservoir of
ideal incompressible fluid [9, 10]. Bernoulli’s equa-
tion is used to model the discharge speed Wg of the
gas, and hence the gas flowrate (when the flow is
unchoked) is given by
Wg¼ 2A2 g
g1:0
 
K1=gpð1:0þgÞ=ga
pa
p
 ð1:0gÞ=g
1:0
" #( )1=2
ð3Þ
where A is the cross-sectional area of the hole; g is
the ratio of specific heats cp=cv, pa is the atmos-
pheric pressure; p is the pressure within the leaking
section. K is a constant derived from p¼Krgg , where
rg is the density of the gas, assuming that no heat
is input into the system and the gas is modelled as
perfect.
If the gas reaches its maximum discharge speed,
the speed of sound, it is assumed that the flow
becomes choked and the flowrate is now modelled
using
Wg ¼ A prgg
2
1:0þ g
 ð1:0þgÞ=ðg1:0Þ" #1=2
ð4Þ
It is assumed that the condensate and gas leak
in the same proportions in which they exist in
the section and that the condensate vaporizes
immediately on release to the atmosphere.
Consequently the condensate is not considered
further.
The modelling of the oil release rate depends on
the location of the leak. If the leak occurs in the pipe-
work before the separator, then it is assumed that
water will be present in the leaking fluid, and the
mass flowrate Wo (kg/s) of oil will be modelled by
Wo ¼ 2A2 p pað Þro
 1=2 ð5Þ
where ro is the density of the oil.
The flowrate of water can be calculated by substi-
tuting the density of water into equation (5). It is
assumed that the water will affect the release rate
on a section but once released, will not be consid-
ered further.
If the leak occurs on a separation vessel, then
water is not present in the leaking fluid and the
height of the hole on the vessel affects the release
rate. The greater the head of oil, the greater the pres-
sure and release rate will be. The head Hhead of oil, is
calculated by subtracting the height of the hole from
the height of the oil and is then used in
Wo ¼ 2A2ro p pa þ groHheadð Þ
 1=2 ð6Þ
to calculate the oil mass flowrate, where g is the
acceleration due to gravity.
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4.3 Gas release detection
The methodology accounts for three types of detec-
tion system on the platform, namely sonic, beam,
and point detectors each of which are modelled
independently. Sonic detectors identify the sound
of gas escaping from the section. The parameter for
this type of detector is the leak rate above which
the leak will be detected. For the platform modelling
presented later it is assumed that, if the gas flowrate
is greater than 0.5 kg/s, the leak will be detected
in 15 s.
Beam and point detectors both rely on detection
of a gas cloud. Point detectors sample the surround-
ing air and beam detectors detect the gas cloud if it
passes through an infrared beam. The time tdet, to
detection, for both of these instruments is calculated
using
tdet ¼ ph
3C
6qg
ð7Þ
where h is the assumed minimum gas cloud
diameter that can be detected, qg is the volumetric
release rate of gas, and C represents the fraction of
the gas in air at which the gas detector is activated.
Dividing the volume of the gas cloud by the rate
at which the gas is released into the module
determines the time required to detect a cloud of a
certain diameter.
For beam detectors the minimum gas cloud
diameter that can be detected is 8m, and 10m is
assumed for point detectors. The failure probability
of each detector system is also taken into account.
If all three detection systems were to become
unavailable, the leak would be detected manually.
In this case the model requires an input to specify
a maximum time to detect a leak.
4.4 Isolation and blowdown system
Once a gas leak is detected, the safety systems
should activate. This includes the isolation and
blowdown systems designed to limit the magnitude
of the leak. Random numbers are compared against
each valves failure probability to determine the func-
tionality of each isolation and blowdown valve asso-
ciated with the module. If the valves are working, it is
assumed that they are activated following a short
delay after the leak is detected.
If an isolation valve on the leaking section is
unavailable, it is assumed that the inventory from
the adjoining section will also contribute to the
leak. If the sections are at higher pressures, it is
assumed that the inventory from the higher-
pressure section contributes to the leak until
the pressure is equal to that of the lower-pressure
section. The inventory of the two sections then
combine, this being a conservative approach to the
modelling.
4.5 Deluge system
On fire or gas detection the deluge system is also
activated. Two parameters need to be specified in
the failure model for this system. It has a probability
of failing to start and a failure rate once active. The
availability of the deluge system is determined as
for the isolation and blowdown systems. If the sys-
tem is available, it is assumed to activate following
a specified short delay after detection; this is the
time taken for water to fill the dry pipework sections.
It is possible that after an active period the system
could fail. This time to failure is generated using
equation (2). The characteristics of an explosion are
affected by whether ignition occurs when the deluge
is active or not.
4.6 Hydrocarbon release rate following isolation
Following isolation it is assumed that the inventory
is no longer infinite. Equations (3) to (6) remain valid
in calculating the release rates; however, the amount
of inventory in the section will now decrease over
time. The subsequent decrease in the pressure, den-
sity of gas, and head of oil will lead to a reduction in
the release rates.
4.7 Ventilation rate
It is assumed that the module is ventilated naturally
by the wind. The ventilation rate for each simulation
is determined by taking a random sample from
between zero and a maximum value for the wind
speed. The wind speed distribution is measured for
the platform.
4.8 Gas cloud build-up and dispersion
Gas released into the module will form a cloud that
will change in size and gas concentration. A conser-
vative approach is taken to the cloud growth model.
As a worst case the gas cloud is assumed to grow at
a uniform stoichiometric concentration, this being
the concentration of gas in air that would cause the
highest overpressures should ignition occur. The
estimation of the cloud volume Vg(at) (m
3) at atmo-
spheric pressure, uses M, the mass of gas released
into the module, and rg(at), the density of the gas at
atmospheric pressure, according to
VgðatÞ ¼
Mg
rgðatÞ
ð8Þ
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When the cloud has expanded to fill the module,
then the concentration can increase up to the UFL.
Because of the open sides of the module, it is
assumed that the cloud volume cannot exceed the
module volume.
Once the leaking inventory is exhausted, then the
ventilation rate is greater than the release rate of
the gas and the cloud disperses. The volume of the
cloud remains constant while the concentration of
the cloud decreases until the stoichiometric concen-
tration is reached. Once the cloud is at stoichio-
metric concentration, the volume of the cloud
decreases.
4.9 Oil pool build-up and reduction
It is assumed that oil released and not ignited will
form a pool assumed to grow with uniform depth.
Prior to ignition the growth of the pool is propor-
tional to the release rate of the oil. The area Ap of
the pool, is calculated using
ApðtÞ ¼
Rtoil
0
WoðtÞdt
rodp
ð9Þ
where Wo is the mass flowrate of oil, toil is the time
for the release of oil, ro is the density of oil, and dp
is the depth of the pool.
Because of the open sides of the module it is
assumed that the pool area cannot exceed the mod-
ule area and the depth of the pool cannot increase.
Following ignition, the area of the pool is assumed
to increase only if the rate of release exceeds the
mass burn rate; otherwise the pool area will decrease
until all oil has been burned. The equation
RB
Rtburn
0
ApðtÞdt
rodp
ð10Þ
is used to calculate the decrease in pool area when
RB is the mass burn rate per unit area of the oil and
tburn is the burn time of the pool fire.
4.10 Ignition model
Three parameters are used to specify the ignition
model: the probability of immediate ignition, and
the rates of occurrence of ignition sources both
pre- and post-isolation. Post-isolation, the rate of
occurrence of an ignition source is reduced owing
to shutdown of the electrically powered equipment
in the module.
4.11 Modelling overpressures
It is assumed that a delayed ignition occurring
following a gas leak will result in an explosion. The
overpressure Opr (Pa) of the explosion is calculated
using
Opr ¼ Oprmax exp A
Cg
Cs
 2Bþ 1
 
Cg
Cs
 1
  
Fc ð11Þ
where Oprmax is the maximum value that the
overpressure can be, and A and B are constants
which give the shape of the distribution. All these
parameters are dependent on the ignition location
and the availability of deluge. Cg is the
concentration of the gas, Cs is the stoichiometric
concentration, and Fc is a factor dependent upon
the fraction of the module occupied by the gas
cloud.
The form of this equation is established with
experimental results presented in reference [11]. A
typical plot of the resulting overpressures with and
without the deluge active is given in Fig. 1. It can
be seen that the overpressures peak at approximately
stoichiometric concentration. Activating the deluge
system prior to ignition can also substantially reduce
the overpressures.
4.12 Modelling fires
It is assumed that the presence of an ignition at the
time of a release of gas (or oil at a high pressure)
will generate a jet fire. A jet fire will also result if
gas continues to be released following an explosion.
The flame length Fj (m) of the jet fire is calculated
using
Fj ¼ 15W 0:41g ð12Þ
which was developed using the work by Thomas [4].
If the initial length is below 2m, it is assumed
that the fire has not become established and is
disregarded.
The time period is established in the code for
which the flame length exceeds 2m. A decrease in
length would be expected after isolation, when the
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release rate of the gas has decreased. The severity of
the jet fire is characterized by the time duration for
which the flame length exceeds 2m.
The occurrence of an ignition occurring during or
following a release of oil will result in a pool fire,
with the diameter of the oil pool forming the base
of a cylindrical flame. The flame length Lp of the
pool fire is calculated using
Lp
D
¼ 6:2u0:044 RB
roðatÞðgDÞ1=2
" #0:254
ð13Þ
derived by Moorhouse and Pritchard [12] to model
the flame height of cylindrical pool fire flames. If
the initial length is below 2m, it is assumed that the
fire has not become established and is disregarded,
where D is the pool diameter, u is the wind speed, R
is the mass burn rate of the oil, and ro(at) is the
density of the oil at atmospheric pressure.
As for jet fires the duration for which the flame
length is over 2m is calculated.
4.13 Modelling a gaseous release following
a liquid release
Following exhaustion of an oil-only release it is
assumed that a section containing gas could have
the potential for an explosion or jet fire. If the pool
fire is burning when the leak begins, the gas will
ignite, causing a jet fire. If the pool fire has been
extinguished before the gas begins to leak, a gas
cloud will form and the potential for an explosion
exists.
5 MODULE DATA
The data used for the analysis, not shown elsewhere
in the paper, are given in Appendix 2. A brief expla-
nation of the data is provided below.
For each isolatable section on the platform, a
set of data describing the section inventory is
required. An example of one section is provided in
Appendix 2 (Table 8) as a full list of all sections
used in the example platform would be too volumi-
nous. The model requires the proportion and densi-
ties of oil, gas, condensate, and water occurring
in the section and the section volume, temperature,
and pressure.
The dimensions of the module under analysis are
required in a number of calculations throughout
the simulation and are provided in each module
input file (Appendix 2, Table 8). Also the ventilation
rate within an open module platform is supplied in
terms of the maximum windspeed.
Other parameters specifying the system function-
ality are provided. These include, the percentage of
the LFL required for gas detection by the automatic
gas detection system (Appendix 2, Table 8).
The probabilities of failure of each of the three
detector types, sonic, beam, and point, are also
required to determine the availability of each indivi-
dual detector type during each simulation. A prob-
ability of failure is also provided for the fire
detection system. All these probabilities are given
in Appendix 2, Table 8.
There will be a time delay between activating the
deluge system and the water spray functioning
while the water is pumped through the dry pipe-
work. The deluge system has an initial unavailability
and also a frequency that the system should fail once
active (Appendix 2, Table 8).
The magnitude of the leak is established from a
hole-size distribution. This is specified in Appendix
2, Table 9, which is derived from existing data on off-
shore oil and gas incidents [13, 14]. The Monte Carlo
method takes random samples from this distribution
of hole sizes for each simulation.
Each isolatable section in a module has an inde-
pendent frequency that a leak will occur. The total
number of sections and the frequency of a leak on
each of the sections used in the example simulation
are also provided in Appendix 2, Table 10.
An ignition model for each module on the example
platform is provided in the input file (Appendix 2,
Table 11). The first parameter specified is the prob-
ability that a leak will be ignited immediately. If an
immediate ignition does not occur, there are then
two further frequencies to model delayed ignition,
the frequency that a delayed ignition occurs prior
to isolation and post-isolation. Post-isolation it is
assumed that many of the potential ignition sources
will be removed.
Three ignition locations are modelled within
SAROS: next to a module wall, in the centre of the
module and at the open end of the module. The
severity of an explosion is dependent on the loc-
ation of the ignition source. For each of these situa-
tions (only one is listed in Appendix 2, Table 12)
the constants A, B, and the maximum overpressure
in equation (11) are provided for both deluge active
and deluge inactive. For other locations the para-
meter which changes significantly is the maximum
overpressure.
In order for a fire or explosion to escalate into
other modules, the ignition must produce an inci-
dent of a certain severity. The minimum flame
length for a fire to be established is provided,
together with the length of time that the fire would
be required to burn for before it would cause struc-
tural damage. For explosions, there is a critical over-
pressure that will fail a boundary between two
modules and an overpressure that is required to
cause structural damage.
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An average population is specified for each mod-
ule; the proportion of this population that is in a
module at the time of ignition is estimated using
random sampling from the population distribution
an example of which is specified in Appendix 2,
Table 13.
6 FATALITY MODELLING
The distribution of personnel over the platform is
used together with the magnitude of each ignition
event to estimate the frequency of fatalities on the
platform. The fatalities have been considered to
occur owing to four types of event: jet fire, pool
fire, explosion, or fire following explosion. Fatalities
due to smoke inhalation have not been considered.
Dependent on the location of the workforce at the
time of any event, the fatalities have been categor-
ized as follows: local, pre-muster, and post-muster.
Local fatalities are those of the workforce in the
same module as the event. The input file provides
the module layout model with the resistance of
each internal wall to explosion overpressure and
fire exposure. An internal wall will fail if either the
overpressure or the fire duration exceeds the resis-
tance of the wall. In the event of failure of an internal
wall, it is assumed that all the workforce within the
module become local fatalities. Pre-muster fatalities
consist of the workforce distributed within the adja-
cent process modules. Failure of the internal wall of
an adjoining module results in the fact that all work-
force within the module become pre-muster fatal-
ities. Post-muster fatalities are the workforce within
the other process modules and the temporary safe
refuge (TR). It is assumed that 50 per cent of the
workforce will be in the TR at any one time. Prior
to evacuation, all workforce will gather in the TR. In
the event of evacuation, the workforce population
will reduce at a specified rate.
The number of fatalities due to an explosion or fire
is a function of the initial mass of fuel in the release,
the module floor area, and the number of people
in the module. The event is modelled as a fireball
and the distance away from the centre, at which
the incident radiation is a safe level, is calculated.
All personnel estimated to be within that distance
are considered fatalities.
Ignition of a gas cloud occurring over 30 s after
detection of the leak will result in no local fatalities
as the population of the module has evacuated. If
the explosion does not then cause the wall to fail, it
is assumed that no pre- or post-muster fatalities are
generated by this explosion. Failure of a wall by an
explosion occurring within 6min of detection will
establish the population of the original module and
the adjacent module as pre-muster fatalities. After
this time it is assumed that all the workforce
has become mustered in the TR and has started to
evacuate.
It is assumed that all the workforce not evacuated
become fatalities if there is no barrier between the
TR and original module and if the overpressure is
sufficient to exceed the blast resistance of the TR.
When one or more barriers exist between the TR
and the original module, an explosion can only
breach the TR if it causes platform collapse.
Further fatalities could result from a jet fire follow-
ing an explosion where collapse of the internal walls
between the event and the TR has occurred. If the
flame length covers the distance from the module
to the TR and fails the wall, all remaining personnel
in the TR are considered fatalities.
7 RESULTS
The method outlined in this paper is used to esti-
mate the frequency of fatalities due to explosions,
jet, and pool fires on an open-sided offshore plat-
form. It is demonstrated by application to a typical
example platform structure where three process
modules, wellhead, separation, and compression,
have been analysed. Data were input to the model
for each module in terms of module dimensions,
hydrocarbon inventory, failure rates and locations
of valves, and times to blowdown.
The model was run through 106 simulations and
requires data on the average number of people in
each module at any one time and the strength of
blast and fire walls to predict the fatalities. It also
requires the distance from each module to the TR
to determine fatalities after mustering has com-
pleted.
Detailed results are output for each section within
a module and a platform summary provided.
7.1 Module results
Results for the separation module are presented
owing to the diversity of events that can occur in
the module since its inventory contains oil, gas,
and condensate. The module contains seven isolat-
able process sections, linked to each other and to
sections outside the module. Figure 2 illustrates the
layout of the sections, the location of the isolation
valves which bound the sections, and blowdown
valves for depressurization.
Two of the sections, labelled 13 and 21, contain
only gas, while sections labelled 32 and 33 are very
small sections which contain only oil. The remaining
three sections in the module, namely section 1, 2,
and 3, contain both gas and oil.
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7.1.1 Explosion results
The explosion frequencies predicted resulting from
a leak on each of the sections are given in Table 1.
These results are categorized with respect to the
overpressure range of the explosion and leaking
section.
Five sections within the module contain gas, two
of which contain only gas. The model predicted a
frequency of 5.55 · 103 per year of an explosion
occurring following a leak on any of the sections
within the module. Section 1 accounted for approxi-
mately 47 per cent of the total explosions within the
module. Section 3 had the second highest frequency,
accounting for 25 per cent of the explosions.
Analysis of these results show that the sections
containing gas at the highest pressures did not gen-
erate the largest number of explosions. It can be rea-
soned that a higher pressure within a section will
generate a higher gas release rate into the module,
and therefore the concentration of the accumulated
gas cloud quickly exceeds the UFL.
The largest proportion of explosions was those
with an overpressure between 0 and 1 bar,
5.54 · 103 per year, accounting for over 99 per cent
of all explosions.
Section 12
Section 11
Section 35
Atmospheric
Separator
Section 1
Test
Separator
Section 2
Inlet
separator
Section 3
GS met
Section 13
Power
Generator
Section 21
Atmospheric
Separator
Section 33
XV128
XV004
Section 31
Section 5
XV124
XV125/149
XV186 LCV146
XV033
LCV034
XV086
LCV072
XV090/01
XV201
XV175
XV086
XV092
XV090
LCV213
Section 6 Section 4
XV6/7
Section 8
XV6/7
Atmospheric
Separator
Section 32
LCV076
Section 34
XV082
XV3423XV4923XV3223
Section 38 Section 37 Section 36
XV122 XV011
XV031
PSV055
Flare
PSV206
PSV012
PSV006/173
Fig. 2 Flow diagram for the separation module
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7.1.2 Jet fire results
Two aspects of fires are considered by the model: the
initial flame length and the length of time that the
fire burns with a flame length of over 2m. The results
for initial flame length for jet fires are presented
within Table 2 and for fire duration in Table 3. The
frequency of each event is again presented for each
section that the leak indicates.
The model predicts a frequency of 2.94 · 102 per
year of a jet fire occurring in all sections in the
separation module.
Section 1 generated the greatest frequency of fires
accounting for approximately 30 per cent of jet fires.
Section 21, containing the lowest volume of gas, gen-
erated the fewest jet fires. Sections 32 and 33,
although containing only oil, generated the second-
and third-highest numbers of fires. This can be
explained on the assumption in the model that igni-
tion of a oil release at a high pressure can be treated
in the same way as a jet fire.
Each section generated fires with initial flame
lengths of between 0 and 100m in length. Overall,
the greatest proportion of jet fires (over 60 per
cent) occurred with an initial flame length between
0 and 10m. 26 per cent of the fires occurred with
an initial flame length of over 90m.
Table 1 Explosion frequencies for the separation module
Explosion frequency (per year) for the following sections
Overpressure range (bar) 1 2 3 13 21 32 33 Module total
0–1 2.60 · 103 7.59 · 104 1.40 · 103 4.65 · 104 3.14 · 104 2.34 · 107 9.37 · 107 5.54 · 103
1–2 1.17 · 106 4.69 · 107 7.03 · 107 9.37 · 107 4.69 · 107 0 0 3.75 · 106
2–3 1.41 · 106 2.34 · 107 0 1.17 · 106 0 0 0 2.81 · 106
3–4 4.69 · 107 0 2.34 · 106 2.34 · 107 0 0 0 3.05 · 106
4–5 7.03 · 107 2.34 · 107 9.37 · 107 9.37 · 107 4.69 · 107 0 0 3.28 · 106
5–6 7.03 · 107 0 9.37 · 107 4.69 · 107 0 0 0 2.11 · 106
6–7 2.34 · 107 2.34 · 107 0 2.34 · 107 0 0 0 7.03 · 107
7–8 0 0 0 2.34 · 107 0 0 0 2.34 · 107
Table 2 Frequencies of the initial flame lengths of the jet fires for the separation module
Frequency (per year) of the initial flame length of the jet fire in the following sections
Initial flame length (m) 1 2 3 13 21 32 33 Module total
0–10 6.24 · 103 1.92 · 103 3.18 · 103 7.87 · 104 6.21 · 104 2.84 · 103 2.27 · 103 1.78 · 102
10–20 4.10 · 104 2.42 · 104 4.22 · 104 4.08 · 104 1.64 · 104 1.77 · 104 1.43 · 104 1.97 · 103
20–30 2.09 · 104 6.09 · 105 1.12 · 104 1.83 · 104 9.00 · 105 6.54 · 105 5.04 · 105 7.71 · 104
30–40 7.03 · 105 6.84 · 105 1.26 · 104 1.05 · 104 1.97 · 105 4.26 · 105 3.61 · 105 4.68 · 104
40–50 5.15 · 105 2.88 · 105 6.02 · 105 4.48 · 105 8.90 · 106 3.12 · 105 2.86 · 105 2.53 · 104
50–60 3.19 · 105 1.85 · 105 3.66 · 105 1.90 · 105 1.57 · 105 2.34 · 105 1.80 · 105 1.63 · 104
60–70 2.65 · 105 1.52 · 105 2.37 · 105 1.80 · 105 1.83 · 105 1.27 · 105 9.14 · 106 1.23 · 104
70–80 2.18 · 105 1.15 · 105 1.48 · 105 6.09 · 106 9.61 · 106 7.73 · 106 8.44 · 106 8.13 · 105
80–90 2.48 · 105 4.92 · 106 1.20 · 105 1.55 · 105 7.97 · 106 1.29 · 105 8.91 · 106 8.69 · 105
90 þ 1.67 · 103 1.94 · 104 2.97 · 104 1.28 · 104 1.13 · 104 2.95 · 105 2.33 · 103 7.68 · 103
Table 3 Frequencies of the durations of the jet fires for the separation module
Frequency (per year) of the duration of the jet fire in the following sections
Fire duration (s) 1 2 3 13 21 32 33 Module total
0.0–7.2 8.33 · 103 2.35 · 103 3.68 · 103 1.39 · 103 9.24 · 104 6.17 · 103 4.90 · 103 2.77 · 102
7.2–14.4 2.15 · 104 1.21 · 104 3.10 · 104 1.05 · 104 6.44 · 105 0 0 8.15 · 104
14.4–21.6 1.92 · 104 7.97 · 105 2.50 · 104 1.40 · 104 6.75 · 105 0 0 7.28 · 104
21.6–28.8 1.52 · 105 5.62 · 106 5.08 · 105 2.23 · 105 1.17 · 105 0 0 1.06 · 104
28.8–36.0 2.34 · 107 0 2.34 · 107 1.64 · 106 4.69 · 107 0 0 2.58 · 106
36.0–72.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
72.0–144.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
144.0–216.0 0 0 0 2.34 · 107 0 0 0 2.34 · 107
216.0–288.0 0 0 0 2.34 · 107 0 0 0 2.34 · 107
288.0 þ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Approximately 94 per cent of the fires had a dura-
tion of between 0 and 7.2 s. The relatively short dura-
tions of the fires are due to the effectiveness of the
detection systems in activating the isolation and
blowdown valves.
7.1.3 Pool fire results
As for jet fires, the initial flame length (Table 4) and
the duration at which the flame of the fire is over
2m in length (Table 5) are estimated for pool fires.
The model predicts a frequency of 8.35 · 103 of a
pool fire occurring within the module per year.
The SAROS results show that pool fires were only
generated from a leak occurring on three sections,
although five sections within the module contained
oil. For the remaining two sections, the oil leaks
occurring produced an initial flame length which
was less than 2m and therefore a fire was not con-
sidered to have been established. Sections 32 and
33 contained only oil and, as expected, resulted in
the two highest frequencies of pool fires. Section 33
generated the highest pool fire frequency overall,
and also the longest initial flame length.
All pool fires occurring within the module had a
flame length of less than 10m and the majority of
the fires had a duration of less than 7.2 s.
7.2 Platform results
The results from the separation, compression, and
wellhead modules were combined to provide overall
predictions for the platform. Table 6 shows the per-
centage of each incident type occurring within each
of the modules. The separation, compression, and
wellhead modules consist of 7, 13, and 6 sections
respectively, each containing gas and/or oil.
Ten of the sections within the compression mod-
ule contain only gas and three contain both oil and
gas. The wellhead module consists of three modules
containing only gas and three containing oil and gas.
Explosions accounted for approximately 19 per
cent of the total incidents on the module. The major-
ity of explosions on the platform occurred with an
overpressure of between 0 and 1 bar and the most
severe explosions originated within the separation
module. This is due to the effectiveness of the detec-
tion and deluge systems installed on the platform.
Approximately 75 per cent of incidents were jet
fires. The majority of fires occurred with an initial
flame length of up to 10m and a duration of up
to 7.2 s.
Table 4 Frequencies of the initial flame lengths of the pool fires for the separation module
Frequency (per year) of the initial flame length of the pool fire in the following sections
Initial flame length (m) 1 2 3 13 21 32 33 Module total
0–10 1.77 · 103 0 0 0 0 3.66 · 103 2.92 · 103 8.35 · 103
10 þ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 5 Frequencies of the durations of the pool fires for the separation module
Frequency (per year) of the duration of the pool fire in the following sections
Fire duration (s) 1 2 3 13 21 32 33 Module total
0.0–7.2 1.33 · 103 0 0 0 0 2.67 · 103 2.25 · 103 6.25 · 103
7.2–14.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14.4–21.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
21.6–28.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
28.8–36.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
36.0–72.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
72.0–144.0 2.34 · 107 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.34 · 107
144.0–216.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
216.0–288.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
288.0 þ 4.40 · 104 0 0 0 0 9.91 · 104 6.72 · 104 2.10 · 103
Table 6 Proportions of events occurring within each
module
Proportion (per cent) of the
following events
Module Explosion Jet fire Pool fire Module total
Separation 23.089 30.606 99.982 33.707
Compression 53.336 49.917 0.018 47.314
Wellhead 23.575 19.477 0.000 18.979
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Pool fires accounted for 6.5 per cent of all inci-
dents on the platform. The majority of pool fires
were generated in the separation module.
7.3 Fatality results
The frequency of fatalities is estimated for each
module of the platform, dependent on whether an
explosion, immediate ignition jet fire, jet fire follow-
ing an explosion, or pool fire has occurred. Table 7,
presents the percentages of fatalities occurring
because of each incident type.
A total frequency of 4.768 · 102 fatalities per year
was estimated for the platform. The compression
module generated the highest number of fatalities,
and the wellhead module the lowest. This reflects
the results for the total number of events occurring
within each of these modules.
Explosions generated the highest frequency of
fatalities, approximately 70 per cent of the total
number, followed by immediate ignition jet fires
(about 25 per cent), pool fires (about 3 per cent),
and jet fires following explosions (about 2 per cent).
Comparison of these results with Table 6 demon-
strates that, on average, more fatalities are generated
by an explosion than by a jet fire. In fact, further
investigation of the results showed that explosions
were the only events severe enough to generate
post-muster fatalities. Pool fires generated fewer
fatalities than jet fires or explosions.
The occurrence of a jet fire following an explosion
generated the lowest number of fatalities. The
majority of the workforce in the area would have
become fatalities during the explosion and the esca-
lation of the event threatens those working in areas
away from the source of the incident.
8 CONCLUSIONS
A methodology has been developed to examine all
possible outcomes following a hydrocarbon release
on an offshore platform. The incidents of concern
are explosions, jet fires, pool fires, and the escalation
of an explosion to a jet fire. A Monte Carlo simula-
tion methodology used has been incorporated into
a software package called SAROS, which can be
used to provide a risk analysis for input to safety
cases.
The simulation can account for a detailed descrip-
tion of the safety features incorporated on the plat-
form. As such it has the maximum impact if
utilized during the design phase where the influence
of parameters of alternate safety system designs can
be evaluated and cost-effective trade-offs made.
It is difficult to draw general design rules for open-
sided modules as the optimal safety features depend
on the equipment contained in each module. For
example the results presented indicate the relative
contributions to hazards for the separation module,
which contains a relatively low-pressure process
involving gas, oil, and condensate. Results for the
compression module with its high-pressure, pre-
dominantly gas inventory would indicate different
trends. However, with a simulation approach such
as that presented, general trends need not be deter-
mined and each potential design can be assessed
individually.
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APPENDIX 1
Notation
A cross-sectional area of the hole (m2)
C constant representing the fraction of gas in air
at which the detector is activated (per cent)
Cg concentration of the gas within the module
(per cent)
Cs stoichiometric concentration (per cent)
dp depth of oil pool (m)
D pool fire diameter (m)
F(t) cumulative failure distribution
Fc fraction of the module occupied by the gas
cloud (–)
Fj flame length of the jet fire (m)
g acceleration due to gravity (m/s2)
h assumed minimum gas cloud diameter (m)
HHead height of the head of oil above a leak on a
vessel (m)
Lp flame length of the pool fire (m)
Mg mass of gas released into the module (kg)
Opr overpressure of the explosion (bar)
Oprmax maximum possible overpressure of the
explosion (bar)
p pressure of gas within the leaking section
(bar)
pa atmospheric pressure (bar)
qg release rate of gas (m
3/s)
RB mass burn rate per unit area of oil (kg/m
2s)
tdet time to detection of a leak (s)
toil time for release of oil (s)
u wind speed (m/s)
Vg(at) volume of the cloud at atmospheric pres-
sure (m3)
Wg mass flowrate of gas (kg/s)
Wo mass flowrate of oil (kg/s)
g ratio of specific heats (cp/cv) (–)
rg density of gas (kg/m
3)
rg(at) density of gas at atmospheric pressure
(kg/m3)
ro density of oil (kg/m
3)
ro(at) density of oil at atmospheric pressure
(kg/m3)
APPENDIX 2
Data for the example
The data used for analysis are given in Tables 8 to 13.
Table 8 Data on the isolatable section, module, and
system parameters Data provided for each
isolatable section (example)
Section volume 108.52m3
Section temperature 334.16K
Section pressure 260 000.00Pa
Section gas density 2.35 kg/m3
Section condensate density 0.00 kg/m3
Section oil density 987.00 kg/m3
Section gas proportion 0.60
Section condensate proportion 0.00
Section oil proportion 0.30
Section water proportion 0.10
Module dimensions
Module height 10.0m
Module width 20.0m
Module length 40.0m
Maximum wind speed 2.4 m/s
System parameters
Percentage of LFL for detection 0.2
Probability of sonic detector failure 0.07
Probability of beam detector failure 0.07
Probability of point detector failure 0.07
Fire detection system availability 0.98
Time delay to activate deluge 45 s
Deluge system unavailability 0.09
Deluge system failure frequency 9.446 · 106 per year
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Table 9 Hole-size distribution
Cumulative probability Hole size (mm)
0.00 0
57.56 5
70.64 10
82.93 20
87.43 30
88.93 40
89.31 50
93.71 80
95.22 100
97.00 150
97.75 200
99.62 500
100.00 600
Table 10 Leak rate data (number of
sections, seven)
Section number
Leak frequency on
section (per year)
1 6.53 · 102
2 2.59 · 102
3 4.18 · 102
13 1.69 · 102
21 1.06 · 102
32 4.13 · 102
33 3.25 · 102
Table 11 Ignition model
Immediate ignition probability 0.07
Delayed ignition frequency prior to isolation 0.28
Delayed ignition frequency post-isolation 0.0028
Table 12 Overpressure data (one location)
Location label loc1
Stochiometric concentration 8.88 per cent
Constant A (deluge inactive) 19.693
Constant B (deluge inactive) 1.0563
Maximum overpressure (deluge inactive) 8.7 bar
Constant A (deluge active) 18.215
Constant B (deluge active) 1.007
Maximum overpressure (deluge active) 0.32 bar
Critical fire flame length 2.0m
Critical fire length (module) 15.0m
Critical fire duration (structure) 120.0min
Critical explosion overpressure (module) 0.6 bar
Critical explosion overpressure (structure) 1.6 bar
Table 13 Workforce distribution
Cumulative
probability
Fraction of
population
2.5 0.10
5 0.30
10 0.45
15 0.55
20 0.65
25 0.75
35 0.85
50 0.95
65 1.05
75 1.15
80 1.25
85 1.35
90 1.45
95 1.55
97.5 1.70
100 1.90
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